The lore is that standard information theory provides an analysis of information quantity, but not of information content. I argue this lore is incorrect, that there is an adequate informational semantics latent in standard theory. The roots of this notion of content can be traced to the secret parallel development of an information theory equivalent to Shannon's by Turing at Bletchley Park, and it has been suggested independently in recent work by Skyrms and Bullinaria & Levy. This paper explicitly articulates the semantics latent in information theory and defends it as an adequate theory of content. I demonstrate that this theory suggests a new perspective on the classic misrepresentation worry for information-based semantics.
Introduction
The locus classicus for information theory is Shannon's (1949) "Mathematical Theory of Communication." Shannon considered the problem of how much redundancy a communication channel needs to ensure uncertainty about the signal stays below an acceptable threshold. In order to analyze this problem, Shannon modeled the source of the signal as an ergodic Markov process and measured the uncertainty in that process by the weighted average of the log probabilities of each symbol, or entropy. This way of conceptualizing the task of information theory motivated Shannon's remark that, while such strings of symbols "[f]requently . . . have meaning . . . , [t] hese semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem" (31). Thus, the lore that Shannon's theory provides no apparatus for analyzing informational content was born. Yet Shannon's was only one of two parallel endeavors to mathematically analyze information. A formal apparatus analogous to Shannon's had already been developed independently at Bletchley Park by Turing and colleagues in their daily attempts to crack the Enigma code. While much of the math was the same (in particular, the appeal to log probabilities as the measure of information, Good, 1979) , the goal of Turing's project was radically different, namely to infer from an opaque string of symbols its intended meaning and, more generally, the Enigma machine settings encoding all German messages that day. Thus, whereas Shannon's project was unconcerned with meaning per se, Turing's was focused on meaning above all else-not the logician's strict notion of meaning as binary truth conditions, but rather meaning in the sense of significance, or "weight of evidence," of a signal in favor of one possible interpretation as opposed to others. More recent work suggests that this measure of significance may be transformed into a recognizable semantics.
The goal of this paper is to motivate a theory of informational content derived entirely from the standard information theory of Shannon and Turing. After briefly rehearsing the challenges for informationbased semantics in general, I defend the view that informational content may be exhaustively represented by a vector of log probability ratios, or s-vector. The s-vector encapsulates in a single formal object the complete significance of a signal or event, i.e. what it "says about the world." I argue that this approach suggests a novel perspective on the classic worry for informational semantics, namely that they cannot account for the possibility of misrepresentation, contrasting the s-vector treatment of this problem with that of the "semantic theory of information" (STI) that emerged in response to the apparent semantic paucity of Shannon's theory (e.g. Dretske, 1981; Floridi, 2004) .
To anticipate at the start one possible line of objection: the "semantics" offered here is not a theory of conventional meaning, nor of intentionality understood in the richest possible sense. It may, however, be construed as a theory of natural meaning (Grice, 1957) , and versions of this theory of content appear in recent work that aims to explain features of conventional meaning in terms of a prior statistical analysis of natural meaning (Bullinaria and Levy, 2007; 2012; Skyrms, 2010; Barrett, 2014) -these antecedents will be discussed further below.
Challenges for Information Semantics
Philosophical theories of meaning typically address two types of question: first, what contents should be assigned to a set of symbols; second, in virtue of what do these symbols bear the contents they do (Speaks, 2016) . The theory offered here assumes an answer to the second question in order to offer an answer to the first. In particular, Shannon information is defined in terms of a probability distribution over events, and thus it is in virtue of patterns in this distribution, in particular statistical correlations, that some events bear content about others. Such information-based semantics have been broadly criticized, and this section briefly considers some key challenges, gesturing at responses that will be articulated in more detail below.
The primary objection to information-based theories of meaning turns on a tension between the philosophical intuition that information supervenes on causality, and is thus factive (Israel and Perry, 1990; Floridi, 2007) , and the de facto formalism of information theory, which defines information in terms of probabilities, or "mere" correlation. This tension produces a dilemma for the would-be informational semanticist: either she embraces factivity, in which case information is never conveyed in error, or she embraces correlation, in which case informational content is not uniquely specified (Fodor, 1984; GodfreySmith, 1989) . In the first case, if information is factive, then a signal bears the information that a particular state of the world unambiguously obtains; if this state of the world is interpreted as its content, then content is precisely specified, but the signal will never be tokened in error. Nevertheless, the possibility of error, i.e. that signals may misrepresent, is typically taken as constitutive of a theory of meaning: "no representation without misrepresentation" goes the slogan. In the latter case, if the merely correlational relationship between signal types and event types is embraced, informational error seems possible: a signal s may be tokened without being caused by one of the event types e with which it is highly correlated, i.e. s may erroneously convey e. Nevertheless, while this strategy appears to countenance error, it does not precisely specify informational content, for how high must P (e|s) be for s to "mean" e? Any answer is arbitrary, and intuitive examples do not uniformly suggest a particular threshold. It was in part this line of argument that motivated the shift toward teleological strategies for naturalizing content (Millikan, 1984; Dretske, 1988) , although debate continues about the extent to which teleosemantics itself relies on patterns of correlation in the environment (Shea, 2007) , provides a satisfactory account of misrepresentation (Fodor, 1990) , or, indeed, addresses the problem of naturalizing semantics at all (Godfrey-Smith, 2006) . The theory offered here is not intended as a thoroughgoing solution to the problem of naturalizing content; nevertheless, it does suggest a new perspective on this problem of error for informational semantics (Section 4).
There are also technical problems that confront any attempt to ground content in correlation. Most obviously, typical measures of correlation (the Pearson correlation coefficient; mutual information) are symmetrical, yet reference, representation, and other semantic concepts are asymmetrical: "dog" refers to furry, tail-wagging quadrupeds, but those quadrupeds themselves do not likewise refer to "dog". This worry is connected to a second, more general asymmetry: probability distributions are defined over homogeneous sets of events, yet we typically only assign semantic content to specialized objects (words, signals, etc.) . It seems any theory of content grounded entirely in correlation must assign contents indiscriminately, not only to events typically understood as meaningful, but to all events. As discussed below, the theory presented here exhibits the first asymmetry, and may model the second.
In addition to these foundational worries, there is the more mundane problem of assuring that a theory of informational content, however modest, is recognizably a semantic theory. STIs take the defining feature of a semantics to be the assignment of propositional content, typically understood as a set of worlds determining truth conditions. Skyrms argues a more general perspective is possible, and that propositional content is really just a "special case of the much richer information-theoretic account of content" offered below (2010, 42) . While it does not directly define truth conditions, this theory is still recognizably semantic in that it assigns evaluable formal objects to the vehicles of meaning. These formal objects are evaluable in the sense that they may be assessed for their fit with the world, and the standards for this assessment establish their content, what they say about the world.
There is, however, a stricter test for the adequacy of a semantic theory than the satisfaction of armchair constraints, and that is its performance on semantic tasks. Section 3.4 discusses the work of Bullinaria and Levy (2007) , who consider a number of different strategies for deriving semantic representations from word co-occurrence statistics, testing them against standard synonymy judgment tasks. The analysis defended below is the one that performed best on such tasks; thus, in a very real sense, it has been empirically validated as a theory of meaning.
S -Vector Semantics
Given a joint probability distribution over a set of events, we want to assign a unique formal object to each event that characterizes the information that event conveys, i.e. what it tells us about the world.
This section elaborates and defends the idea that the information conveyed should be identified with the change in information conditional on the event (c.f. Skyrms, 2010, 34) . The formal object that encapsulates this change in information is the vector of log probability ratios, which I call an s-vector. The section begins by motivating the idea that log probability ratios characterize the information one event carries about another; the s-vector is the natural generalization of this idea. After discussing its basic properties, I survey theoretical and empirical support for the claim that the s-vector provides an appropriate analysis of informational content.
Information in one event about another
Consider a finite probability space Ω, A, P , where Ω is a finite set, A is an algebra over Ω (i.e. a family of subsets closed under complement and union), which we interpret as the set of possible events, and P is a probability distribution over A. Given just this probability measure, we'd like to characterize the information one event conveys about another. First, however, let's consider the measure of information quantity in a single event, call it I; we'd like I(e) to satisfy three properties:
1. If P (e) = 1, then the quantity of information provided by e is zero, i.e. I(Ω) = 0; 2. All possible events contain positive information, i.e. I(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ A;
3. An impossible event conveys infinite information, i.e. P (e) = 0 implies I(e) = ∞.
A function that satisfies these three constraints is the negative log of the probability (independent of choice of base):
This function captures our intuitions that the lower the probability of an event, the more information it contains; the certain event contains no information; and as an event approaches impossibility, its informational value grows exponentially (Osteyee and Good, 1974 ). Shannon's entropy measure is just the weighted average of the informational quantity of each event in a partition of A, e.g. for e i ∈ Ω,
Now, for any two events, e 1 , e 2 ∈ A, what information does e 1 convey about e 2 ? We can reconceive this as a quantitative question: how does e 1 change our information about the possibility of e 2 ? This question was conceived by Turing (as channeled by Good, 1950; 1979) as the question: how does the evidence e 1 affect our assessment of the hypothesis e 2 ? Turing and Good take this to be the log ratio between the probability of e 2 given e 1 and the prior probability of e 2 . The basic idea is that subtracting the information in e 2 , given e 1 , from the prior information in e 2 , measures the change in information about e 2 , i.e. the information about e 2 conveyed by e 1 : 2 I(e 1 : e 2 ) = I(e 2 ) − I(e 2 |e 1 ) = − log P (e 2 ) + log P (e 2 |e 1 ) = log P (e 2 |e 1 )
This definition has the intuitive features we want in a measure of information conveyed by one event about another:
2 Strictly speaking, when presenting this definition, Good conceives of e 1 as the hypothesis and e 2 as the evidence; however, the two expressions are equivalent:
P (e 2 |e 1 ) P (e 2 ) = P (e 2 |e 1 )P (e 1 ) P (e 2 )P (e 1 ) = P (e 2 &e 1 ) P (e 2 )P (e 1 ) = P (e 1 |e 2 )P (e 2 ) P (e 2 )P (e 1 ) = P (e 1 |e 2 ) P (e 1 ) .
Here I give the version that conforms with later discussion, c.f. Skyrms, 2010, 35 , footnote 4.
1. If P (e 2 |e 1 ) = P (e 2 ), then e 1 conveys nothing about e 2 , and I(e 1 : e 2 ) = 0; 2. As P (e 2 |e 1 ) grows larger than P (e 2 ), e 1 conveys more information in favor of e 2 occurring, and I(e 1 : e 2 ) grows more and more positive;
3. As P (e 2 |e 1 ) shrinks smaller than P (e 2 ), e 1 conveys more information against the occurrence of e 2 , and I(e 1 : e 2 ) grows more and more negative.
Finally, since all we know about these events is given by the probability distribution, I characterizes the complete information about e 2 conveyed by e 1 .
Introducing the s-vector
I measures the informational content in one event about another, but what is the total informational content of an event? We want a single, unique formal object that captures the informational content e conveys about all possible events, i.e. what it says about the world tout court. One strategy is simply to collect the separate pieces of informational content conveyed about other events into a single object that nevertheless keeps them distinct, for instance, a vector. Since A is finite, we can index it by the natural numbers, and the content ν of e will be given by the s-vector ν(e) = log P (e 1 |e) P (e 1 ) , log P (e 2 |e) P (e 2 ) , log P (e 3 |e) P (e 3 ) , . . . .
ν(e) is the basic semantic object implicit in standard information theory, encapsulating the complete informational content of the event e.
To illustrate the features of the s-vector, consider how it handles a typical example of natural meaning, the claim that smoke is a sign of fire. S -vector semantics presupposes a joint probability distribution over a set of events including both smoke and fire. At the slot in the vector ν(smoke) corresponding to log P (fire|smoke)/P (fire), there will be a relatively large number, indicating the dramatically increased probability of fire given smoke over the prior probability of fire, i.e. that smoke "means" fire. Yet smoke will mean other things as well: there will also be large values at slots in ν(smoke) corresponding to the events danger and low visibility. In contrast, events like thunderstorm may correspond to slots with very low negative numbers, indicating their probability has decreased dramatically. In keeping with the spirit of an informational semantics, the content of ν(smoke) will depend upon contingent statistical features of the environment: in a world with constant fire, and only occasional smoke, smoke will not mean fire.
Unlike a naïve approach to deriving content from correlation, which identifies the content of one event directly with the (set of) event(s) with which it is (strongly) correlated, s-vector semantics exhibits the asymmetry we expect from a proper theory of meaning. Events are bearers of information, but they are not themselves meanings. On this view, it is neither events, nor even probabilities of events, but changes in the probabilities of events that are conveyed by (are the content of) a meaningful event. So, while e will mean ν(e), i.e. a change in the distribution over possible ways the world might be, ν(e) will not "mean" e, since it is not itself a bearer of meaning, as desired.
The sense in which s-vector semantics is most clearly analogous to our intuitive understanding of meaning, for instance in natural language, is that it supports a graded synonymy relation. If e 1 and e 2 are very close in meaning, i.e. "say" very similar things about the state of the world, then ν(e 1 ) and ν(e 2 ) will be geometrically "close" by any plausible measure of vector distance. Dark clouds and low pressure both mean rain, etc.; correspondingly, their respective s-vectors will fall close together.
3 As e 1 and e 2 approach complete antonymy, i.e. convey maximally incompatible states of the world, their corresponding meanings approach ν(e 1 ) = −ν(e 2 ). Note, however, that antonymy is not the same as negation, e 1 = −e 2 does not in general imply that ν(e 1 ) = −ν(e 2 ). The reason for this is that the value of ν(e) depends on the correlation between e and other possible events; however, the correlation between e and o may not be inversely, or even systematically, related to the correlation between −e and o. If we find out that the die came up 2, we learn with certainty it came up even, but if we we learn the die did not come up 2, we only learn a little bit about whether it came up even; likewise, red leaves may mean autumn, but no red leaves may not mean much at all about autumn one way or another.
This is a particular instance of a more general feature of s-vector semantics that distinguishes it from typical formal semantics-it is not recursively defined. There is no general relationship between ν(e 1 ), ν(e 2 ), and ν(e 1 &e 2 ), because the degree of correlation between e 1 and e 2 does not systematically determine their respective correlations with other events, yet these correlations are what determine the relevant s-vectors. This is a straightforward consequence of taking informational content to be determined by a joint probability distribution: since we cannot derive P (o|e 1 ) from P (o) and P (e 1 ), nor P (e 1 &e 2 ) from P (e 1 ) and P (e 2 ), we should not expect to be able to derive ν(e 1 &e 2 ) from ν(e 1 ) and ν(e 2 ). Instead, s-vectors must be defined directly in terms of the joint probability distribution, as this is where the relevant correlations are encoded. If s-vectors are not recursively defined, does that mean they do not constitute a "semantics"? To conclude as such would constitute a kind of logico-chauvinism, insisting all theories of meaning must conform to one particular style of formal analysis; such chauvinism would not only rule out s-vector semantics, but also other heterodox theories of meaning, for instance holism or contextualism.
Skyrms: semantics & inference
What of the second asymmetry discussed above? We typically only assign meanings to some events, not all of them. In fact, this is the scenario motivating Skyrms (2010) , who considers how signaling agents evolve the ability to communicate effectively about states of the world. The s-vector is useful for capturing the statistical content about these states conveyed by a signal, but signals themselves are not events of semantic interest, i.e. they are vehicles, but not topics, of communication. Furthermore, Skyrms' analysis of content is motivated by the use to which signals are put-receivers use them to predict the state of the world, so the correct analysis of signal content is the one that characterizes exactly what may be inferred about the world from it. This section elaborates on these two points.
Skyrms' vector is defined by the log ratio between two probability distributions: the prior distribution over states of the world, and the posterior distribution over states of the world, conditional on the signal received. The basic model introduced above may easily be refined to accommodate this interpretation, for instance by treating Ω as sorted into two types of primitive event: states of the world W and signals S, i.e. Ω = W ∪ S. Then the content of each s i ∈ S is given by the vector ν(s i ) = log P (w 1 |s i ) P (w 1 ) , log P (w 2 |s i ) P (w 2 ) , log P (w 3 |s i ) P (w 3 ) , . . . ,
events such as this may be useful. Prototypical examples of natural signs "a means b" are such that a is perceptually salient, while b is an event of great importance. For instance, smoke is easy to spot from a great distance, or by smell as well as sight, while fire is an event of great importance due to its potential danger and destructive force. Examples like "these spots are a sign of measles" are even more pronounced: spots are a very easy to see external property, while measles is completely hidden from our regular sensory apparatus, yet a matter of grave concern. Nevertheless, at least when we consider natural signs, the homogeneity of the general account, treating every event type as a potential bearer of content, should be considered a feature, not a bug. The information-theoretic perspective on natural meaning is egalitarian about the Dretskean "flow of information": "The world is full of information" (Skyrms, 2010, 44 Shannon's H). Given the probability measures p(·) and p e (·) = p(·|e), the KL-divergence of the latter with respect to the former is given by
D is just the weighted average over the components of an s-vector. Averaging erases the particular content conveyed by e in favor of an overall measure of informational divergence of p e from p. from a piece of evidence. For explicit arguments to this effect see, for instance, Jaynes (1957) or Shore and Johnson (1980) ; for relevant surveys see Domotor, Zanotti, and Graves (1980) and Csiszár (2008) .
Empirical validation
Skyrms is the first to defend the s-vector as an analysis of content in the philosophical literature; however, essentially the same analysis of content appears earlier in Bullinaria and Levy (2007; c.f. 2012) . B&L participate in a research program that attempts to compute semantic representations from word cooccurrence statistics, testing the validity of these representations on semantic tasks. For instance, given a large corpus, can we derive a representation of the meaning of the word "hypothesize" from just the relative frequencies of words appearing before (and/or) after it? Can we use this representation to determine whether, say, it is more similar in meaning to "posit" or "subjugate"?
Since the task of collecting and manipulating word co-occurrence statistics is computationally demanding, research on this project initially proceeded on the basis of a priori assumptions about (a) how large or small a contextual window of co-occurring words around the target to consider; (b) how to represent the results of the collected statistics; and (c) what measure of distance between these representations to use. What distinguished the study of Bullinaria and Levy (2007) at the time was that it treated these as empirical questions. 5 By systematically varying the size of the contextual window that determined their co-occurrence statistics, the manner in which those statistics were represented, and the distance metric between representations, they were able to generate a wide number of different semantic representations, which they then tested on a variety of semantic tasks, such as semantic categorization, syntactic categorization, and synonymy questions from the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Scoring each combination of answers to the three questions on these tests allowed them to empirically determine the optimal semantic representation.
The optimal answer to question (b), the best way to represent co-occurrence statistics for semantic tasks, was as a vector of positive Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI); PMI simpliciter is exactly the same measure as Good's I. B&L first determined a measure of co-occurrence statistics p, were p(w) is just the number of occurrences of w divided by the total number of (token) words in the corpus, and the relative frequency of a word w given it appears within the window of co-occurring contextual words around a target word t, p(w|t), is just the number of times w appears with t divided by the total number of appearances of t. Then the PMI "semantic vector" representing the meaning of a target word t with respect to all potential context words in the corpus, c i , is given by
i.e. identical with ν(t) (513-4).
Strictly speaking, of all the representations B&L considered, the PMI vector did worst, while a slight modifcation of it, the positive PMI vector did best. The positive PMI vector simply replaces all negative-valued components of a PMI vector with zeros. Essentially, PMI simpliciter performed poorly on semantic tasks because very large negative components ensured that some words that should have been judged semantically close were measured as far apart; in the words of B&L: "Negative values indicate less than the expected number of co-occurrences, which can arise for many reasons, including a poor coverage of the represented words in the corpus" (514). I think this result should still be interpreted on balance as constituting empirical support for the s-vector analysis of informational content. Recall that Shannon semantics assumes ergodicity in the information source-this means that in the long term observed statistics will match stable underlying probabilities in the source. The need for positive PMI here, as B&L acknowledge, is thus due simply to a discrepancy between the assumption of the ideal theory, that observed frequencies match underlying probabilities, and the reality of small data sets. In fact, when tested on an even smaller data set than that initially considered, all B&L's semantic measures did worse, but the positive PMI outperformed its competitors by an even greater margin.
Even if this analysis is correct, and the empirical success of positive PMI vectors on semantic tasks confirms the legitimacy of s-vector semantics, there are some wrinkles to the story. The approach of B&L is that of the engineer-use whatever achieves results for the task at hand-but an engineering solution does not always conform to our theoretical expectations. In this case, there is some question about the exact significance of the most effective distance measures between semantic vectors. B&L found that Cosine distance (as opposed to, say, Euclidean or City Block) between positive PMI vectors produced the best results. Furthermore, KL-divergence between probability distributions performed only modestly amongst all measures considered. Thus, the theoretical complementarity between KLdivergence-based inference and s-vector representation argued in the previous section is not mirrored in empirical performance. Nevertheless, B&L's results show both that an information-based semantics may solve real-world semantic tasks, and that optimal performance on such tasks requires a theory very like s-vector semantics.
Error and Ergodicity
Do we want an informational semantics on which signals may exhibit error, i.e. may misrepresent the world? As discussed in Section 2, there is a tension here between the intuition that information should be factive and the intuition that meaningfulness implies the possibility of misrepresentation. The aims of this section are, first, to show that the standard formulation of this worry is inappropriate for an informational semantics based on Shannon's theory; second, to consider how a natural event assigned meaning in accordance with s-vector semantics may nevertheless misrepresent the state of the world.
The typical conception of the problem of error for an informational semantics (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1984; Godfrey-Smith, 1989) , has focused on the causal, nomic, or etiological relationship supposedly required for one event to convey information about another. The worry is: how can one event bear the information that another event obtains, if that event does not in fact obtain? Suppose, for instance, that smoke rises from damp, smouldering grass (e.g. during the sending of smoke signals), but there is in fact no fire-how could such smoke, then, carry information about fire? If it did bear such information, we could assess the smoke as misrepresenting the state of the world, but since it bears no causal relation to fire, it seems it cannot bear information about fire in the first place.
As a conceptual problem for information-based semantics, this worry appears for "semantic theories of information," which treat information content as sets of events or worlds. STIs are motivated by the lore that Shannon's theory concerns information quantity only, and must be supplemented with a semantic component in order to assign meaningful signals propositional content. Dretske (1981) , for instance, demands that P (w|s) = 1 for some nomic reason if s is to bear the informational content that w (65).
For Dretske, once one moves to a region where smouldering grass may produce smoke but not fire, smoke no longer "means" fire. Broadly construed, situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983; Israel and Perry, 1990) , epistemic logics (e.g. van Benthem, 2011), and Floridi's "strongly semantic" theory (2004) are all instances of STIs.
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S -vector semantics is not subject to the problem of error construed in this way. Since it does not take meanings to be sets of events, there is no question of whether an event may fall inside such a semantic set even though it does not obtain. More generally, Shannon's theory does not presuppose that information supervenes on nomic relationships, and thus is not committed to the factivity of information. On the standard theory, s may bear the information that the probability of w is high, and yet w still not obtain, without contradiction. The claim here is not that Shannon's analysis of the concept "information" is "correct," nor that the factive analysis is not more in keeping with our intuitions about information.
Rather, the claim is simply that Shannon's theory rests on a different conceptual foundation than STIs, and insofar as one is interested in the semantics it implies, those semantics need not presuppose that a signal may only bear information about states of the world that actually obtain.
So, on the s-vector analysis, there is a straightforward way in which smoke may "mean" fire-namely it dramatically raises the probability of fire-even when a token instance of smoke is caused by smouldering, fire-less grass. In fact, since the s-vector is defined in terms of probability ratios, representing only relative change in probability, it does not even preserve the key quantity for Dretske's analysis, the value of the posterior probability. The content that smoke conveys about fire will be high or low depending on whether there is a large or small difference between the prior and the posterior probabilities of fire given smoke-the absolute value of the posterior, in particular whether it is 1 or not, is irrelevant.
However, while this shows that the problem of error as described for STIs does not take the same form for s-vector semantics, it does not imply that the problem does not arise. For the argument in the previous paragraph does not at all show that a smoke event that is not caused by fire is somehow in error in what it says about fire, and thereby an instance of misrepresentation. In fact, it demonstrates quite the opposite: that a smoke event may be caused by smouldering grass, indicate that the probability of fire has dramatically increased, and yet still not be in error. So, if it is a requirement on meaningfulness that misrepresentation be possible, examples such as this will not be enough to demonstrate that s-vector semantics is a true theory of meaning. What is really needed for a signal to convey the meaning encapsulated in its s-vector, yet still be in error, i.e. misrepresent the world, is for the meaning it conveys about the change in probabilities to be incorrect. The smoke from the smouldering grass is not in error because it is not caused by fire, but it may be in error if it indicates the probability of fire dramatically increases when it does not; or, more subtly, if it misindicates the degree to which the probability of fire increases. On this reading, an instance of smoke may be caused by fire, may "mean" fire, and yet still misrepresent the state of the world; for instance, if it does not convey that the probability of fire has increased enough. Is there room for such error in Shannon's theory? We've seen a hint at the answer already in the discussion of Bullinaria and Levy: a signal may misrepresent the world if Shannon's assumption of ergodicity is not satisfied.
B&L faced difficulties due to a somewhat trivial failure of ergodicity assumptions; namely, too small a data set meant observed relative frequencies failed to match "true" underlying probabilities. Arguably, this is merely an epistemic problem-it is not that the PMI semantic vectors misrepresented the meanings of words, but rather that B&L were unable to determine the "true" PMI semantic vectors. Nevertheless, there is also a potential metaphysical failure of Shannon's ergodicity assumption: underlying probabilities may fail to be stable. Standard information theory, and the definition of the s-vector, presuppose that the probabilistic relations between events are fixed. If, conversely, correlations change over time, then the static ratio of probabilities "meant" by an event in s-vector semantics may fail to match the "true" probability ratio, and thus that event may misrepresent the state of the world.
Most metaphysics of information is in the STI tradition; there is no off-the-shelf metaphysical framework for making sense of standard information theory, and thus s-vector semantics, in a non-ergodic world. The Skyrms tradition has typically focused on how signaling behavior may evolve in an ergodic world, although some work has been done on the repurposing of learned signals to new aspects of the environment (Barrett, 2014) , a problem arguably analogous to that of tracking changes in observed statistics.
Some limited work in machine learning has examined strategies for probability matching when causal structure may change and ergodicity is only local (Kummerfeld and Danks, 2013) . Nevertheless, a full analysis of this problem, and thus of the problem of error as it applies to s-vector semantics, remains a project for future work.
Conclusion
Contrary to popular lore, there is a theory of content latent in standard, Shannon information theory:
s-vector semantics. Its historical roots are Turing and Good's work at Bletchley Park; Skyrms has argued for it theoretically; while Bullinaria and Levy have vaidated it empirically. The problem of error for s-vector semantics looks radically different than that for semantic theories of information. A full analysis of the s-vector problem of error will require a metaphysical theory of the flow of information in a non-ergodic world.
